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REGULATION OF BUSINESS-SALES-BELOW-COST STATUTES-THE 
ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION AND THE DEFENSE OF MEETING COMPETI-
TION-Recent years have seen a decline in the effectiveness of 
resale price maintenance through state fair trade statutes. In-
validation of non-signer clauses on constitutional grounds has 
been frequent, resulting in loss of the manufacturer's means of 
enforcement against those distributors who chose not to contract 
with him.1 And, even in a state whose fair trade act has been 
upheld, the act's efficacy may be undercut by decisions exempting 
from its operation a mail-order house in a non-fair trade jurisdic-
tion.2 Thus, in search of greater protection, manufacturers and 
distributors may devote additional attention to state statutes pro-
hibiting sales below cost, variously labeled as unfair practices acts 
or unfair sales acts, and often found in conjunction with anti-
discrimination provisions. 
In general, these sales-below-cost statutes, found in thirty-one 
states,3 prohibit sales, offers of sales, or advertisements of sales be-
low the seller's cost, and provide both criminal and civil sanctions. 
Cost, as applicable to the distributive trades, 4 is defined as the 
lower of invoice or replacement cost, less trade discounts/; plus 
1 E.g., Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, (Wash. 1959) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[69,520. 
See 60 A.L.R. (2d) 420 (1958). 
2 General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., (2d Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 681, 
cert. den. 355 U.S. 824 (1957). 
8 Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§44-1461 to 44-1466; Ark. Stat. (1947) §§70-301 to 70-314; 
Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code (Deering, 1951) §§17000-17101; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§§55-2-1 to 55-2-17; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958 Rev.) §§42-111 to 42-115; Hawaii Rev. Laws 
(1955) §§205-1 to 205-13; Idaho Code (1948) §§48-401 to 48-412; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 
1949) §§50-401 to 50-408; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) §§365.030, 365.040, 365.060; La. Rev. Stat. 
(1950) §§51:421-51:427; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 184, §§1-7; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 83, 
§§111-115; Mass. Laws Ann. (1954) c. 93, §§14E-14K; Minn. Stat. (1957) §§325.01-325.07; 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §§51-101 to 51-118; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; reissue of 1952) 
§§59-1201 to 59-1206; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §§358:1-358:5; N. J. Stat. Ann. (1940) 
§§56:4-7 to 56:4-14; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§51-1001 to 51-1008; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 15, 
§§598.1-598.11; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§646.100-646.180, 646.990; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
1953) tit. 73, §§211-217; R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §§6-13-1 to 6-13-8; S.C. Code (1952) §66-65; 
Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §§69-301 to 69.306; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§13-5-7 to 13-5-18; 
Va. Code (1950) §§59-9 to 59-19-1; Wash. Rev. Code §§19.90.010-19.90.920; W.Va. Code 
(1955) §§4678 (Ba)-4678 (Sn); Wis. Stat. (1957) §100.30; Wyo. Stat. (1957) §§40-24 to 40-33. 
In most cases, references to statutes in this comment will be by states only. 
4 Many of the statutes cited in note 3 supra also prohibit below-cost sales by manu-
facturers, for whom a separate definition of cost is applicable. Although outside the 
scope of this discussion, many of the same considerations discussed herein are applicable 
to manufacturers' sales. 
5 Several states except "customary discounts for cash" from this deduction, e.g., Mass. 
Laws Ann. (1954) c. 93, §14E (a). Thus, savings actually realized by a merchant cannot be 
passed on to the purchaser, but must revert to the merchant as increased profit. The only 
apparent purpose for the exception is to remove a competitive advantage which the 
affluent merchant possesses over one who must buy on credit. Failure of the statute to 
allow for cash discounts rendered that portion unconstitutional in Cohen v. Frey & 
Son, Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A. (2d) 267 (1951). 
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freight and miscellaneous charges, plus the "cost of doing busi-
ness."6 A number provide that in the absence of proof of a lesser 
cost, the markup for the cost of doing business shall be a :fixed 
percentage (ranging from 2% to 12%) of other costs.7 Cost 
surveys conducted by trade associations are given evidentiary 
status in some statutes.8 Injunctive relief is commonly available to 
"any person,"9 and it has been held that the only interest plaintiff 
need show thereunder is that of a citizen of the community.10 
Usually, the statute is made inapplicable in certain circumstances, 
such as sales made under judicial order, sales in conjunction with 
termination of business, or sales at prices set to meet those of com-
petitors.11 
On the whole, these statutes have gained judicial acceptance.12 
While their provisions have been most frequently invoked in re-
tail sales of cigarettes and groceries,13 they are not so limited in 
their application.14 Hence, they appear to furnish an effective 
means whereby minimum resale prices may be lawfully controlled. 
The purpose of this comment is to discuss two controversial 
aspects of the sales-below-cost statutes: (1) the intent or effect re-
quired for a :finding of violation and (2) the defense of meeting 
competition. 
I. SALES BELOW COST AT COMMON LAW 
The early Schoolmaster Case15 denied a remedy to an entre-
preneur who lost business because a new competitor's prices were 
6 E.g., Minn. Stat. (1957) §325.01, subdiv. 5. 
7 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958 Rev.) §42-111 (a) (3). 
s E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) §365.030 (4). 
9 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §55·2·9 (1). 
10 Heffelfinger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1940) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 
117241.07. 
11 E.g., Minn. Stat. (1957) §325.06. South Carolina has no express exceptions. Con-
necticut and Rhode Island make no exception for meeting competitive prices. 
12 The sales-below•cost statutes have been declared unconstitutional as a whole or 
in important particulars in four states; Colorado, Standard Store v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1955) 1955 CCH Trade Cas. 1J68,153; Kansas, State v. Consumers Ware-
house Market, Inc., 183 Kan. 502, 329 P. (2d) 638 (1958); Maryland, Cohen v. Frey & 
Son., Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A. (2d) 267 (1951); New Jersey, Lief v. Packard-Bamberger 
& Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A. (2d) 291 (1939). A more critical approach may be indicated 
by the Kansas decision, which invalidated the entire statute upon a finding that a pro-
vision exempting grain and feed dealers from its operation was not separable. 
13 For reasons why these markets are not amenable to fair trade, see Grether, "Ex-
perience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting," 24 CALIF. 
L. REv. 640 at 652 (1936). 
14 Other statutes prohibiting below-cost sales of specific merchandise, most frequently 
tobacco and dairy products, are widespread. Except where they are particularly relevant 
they are outside the scope of this discussion. 
15 Court of Common Pleas, Hilary Term, 1410, Y.B. Hen. J. V., f. 47, pl. 21. 
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less than a third as high as the plaintiff's. Although there was no 
allegation that the new price was not profitable, the judges' com-
ments give no indication that this would have changed the result. 
This virtually complete freedom of price competition was not 
clearly limited until some five centuries later, when, in the land-
mark case of Tuttle v. Buck,16 it was held that allegations that 
defendant had established a competing enterprise with the sole 
and malicious purpose of injuring and destroying plaintiff's busi-
ness stated a cause of action.17 One judge would have required 
the additional allegation that defendant's business was being run 
at a loss. This case and others18 indicate that sales below cost 
were not actionable at common law unless they were utilized as 
part of a plan whose purposes were solely malicious, and thus not 
designed to effectuate a legitimate business end. 
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR VIOLATION 
The elements of violation in the various states can best be 
compared by viewing the statutes in their historical perspective. 
The earliest statute, enacted by South Carolina in 1902 as part of 
its antitrust legislation,19 prohibited sales below cost when made 
with the intent to drive out or financially injure competitors. It 
has found little, if any, application within the state and has not 
been imitated elsewhere. 
The antitrust era found many states enacting anti-discrimina-
tion statutes. Typical of these was the South Dakota act20 which 
prohibited discrimination in price between different market areas 
when for the purpose of destroying competition. Its constitu-
tionality was upheld in Central Lumber Company v. South Da-
kota.21 But a statute which prohibited discrimination without 
requiring a sinister purpose or intent was not so fortunate. In 
16107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). Contra, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 
Gow &: Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), affd. [1892] A.C. 25. 
17 The case recognized a general principle of tort liability first discernible in Keeble 
v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1706). Justice Holmes stated in Aikens 
v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 at 204- (1904): "It has been considered that, prima facie, the 
intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter 
of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if 
the defendant is to escape." Variously labeled as the "prima facie tort" or "justification" 
rationale of liability, it is to be contrasted with the "nominate tort" approach. See OP-
PENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACfICES-CASES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS, C. 1 (1950). 
18 Cf. Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923). 
19 S.C. Acts, 1902, p. 1057, now S.C. Code (1952) §66-65. Under it, the seller is 
guilty of conspiracy to form a monopoly and of unfair competition. 
20 S.D. Code (1939) §13.1803 carries the substance of the 1907 act. 
21226 U.S. 157 (1912). 
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Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota22 the Supreme Court de-
clared Minnesota's statute unconstitutional in words which had a 
profound effect on subsequent legislation regulating business 
conduct.23 
The modern development of sales-below-cost statutes was 
initiated by a 1933 California amendment to its Unfair Practices 
Act.24 The influence of the Fairmont Creamery case was apparent 
in the statute's prohibition of sales below cost only when made with 
a purpose of injuring and destroying competition. The following 
year in Nebbia v. New York25 the Supreme Court upheld state 
power to fix prices in fields other than public utilities, using 
language which was as broad as that in the Fairmont Creamery 
case was restrictive.26 Regardless of the seemingly permissive 
Nebbia decision, a 1935 amendment27 to the California statute 
narrowed instead of broadened that state's prohibition by adding 
the defense of meeting competition. Another important feature 
of the 1935 amendment was the authorization of cost surveys as 
evidence of cost of doing business. 
Two succeeding events played an important role in the further 
development of the statutes. In 1935 the decision in Schechter 
22 274 U.S. 1 (1927). 
23 "It seems plain enough that the real evil supposed to threaten the cream business 
was payment of excessive prices by powerful buyers for the purpose of destroying compe-
tition. To prevent this the statute undertook to require every buyer to adhere to a 
uniform price fixed by a single transaction. 
"As the inhibition of the statute applies irrespective of motive, we have an obvious 
attempt to destroy plaintiff in error's liberty to enter into normal contracts long regarded 
not only as essential to the freedom of trade and commerce but also as beneficial to the 
public. Buyers in competitive markets must accommodate their bids to prices offered by 
others, and the payment of different prices at different places is the ordinary consequent. 
Enforcement of the statute would amount to fixing the price at which plaintiff in error 
may buy, since one purchase would establish this for all points without regard to ordi-
nary trade conditions. 
"The real question comes to this-May the State, in order to prevent some strong 
buyers of cream from doing things which may tend to monopoly, inhibit plaintiff in error 
from carrying on its business in the usual way heretofore regarded as both moral and 
beneficial to the public and not shown now to be accompanied by evil results as ordi-
nary incidents? Former decisions here require a negative answer. We think the inhi-
bition of the statute has no reasonable relation to the anticipated evil .••. " 274 U.S. 1 
at 8-9 (1927) 
24 Cal. Stat. (1933) 1280. 
25 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
26 "So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other 
constitutional restriction, a ~tate is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably 
?e deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to 
its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is 
declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable 
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the 
requirements of due process are satisfied ..•• " 291 U.S. 502 at 537 (1934). 
27 Cal. Stat. (1935) 1546. 
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Poultry Corp. v. United States28 struck down the NRA legislation, 
and with it the various codes of fair competition, many of which 
had contained prohibitions of sales below cost which, of course, 
had nationwide application.29 Then, in 1936, the Clayton Act30 
was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,31 section 2 (a) of which 
prohibited discrimination in price where specified anti-competi-
tive effects might result.32 And section 3 made it unlawful to sell 
at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competi-
tion or eliminating a competitor."33 
With the removal of the NRA sanctions providing a need, and 
congressional approval of similar legislation furnishing the en-
couragement, the period from 1936 to 1941 saw the adoption of 
sales-below-cost statutes by more states and territories. These 
statutes may be categorized as either (I) intent or (2) intent or 
effect types. 
During 1936 and 1937, six states34 adopted legislation almost 
identical to the 1935 California statute, requiring an intent to 
injure competitors and destroy competition.35 Variations upon 
this theme first appeared in the New England states, in provisions 
requiring an intent to injure competitors or destroy competition.36 
The remaining five states37 in which intent is the sole basis for 
violation have differing requirements, but an intent to induce 
28 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
29 For the codes which contained such prohibitions, see LYON, THE NATIONAL R.EcoVERY 
ADMINIS11tATION 580-586 (1935). 
30 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
3149 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§13, 13a, 13b. 
32 " .•. and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, 
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the 
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .•• .'' 49 Stat. 1526 
(1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (a). 
33 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13a. See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation 
Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), rehearing den. 355 U.S. 967 (1958), holding that §3 does not 
give a private cause of action. 
34 Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, Wyoming. Four of these states 
were sufficiently impressed with the California example to incorporate an identical 
typographical error into their legislation. See Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau, Inc. v. 
National Candy and Tobacco Co., II Cal. (2d) 634 at 660, 82 P. (2d) 3 at 18 (1938). 
Compare Ark. Stat. (1947) §70-313; Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §55-2-16; Mont. Rev. Code 
Ann. (1947) §51-II7; Wyo. Stat. (1957) §40-33 (" .•. this act shall be literally [sic] 
construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved"). 
35 California in 1937 amended its provision to require a purpose to injure competitors 
or to injure competition. Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code (Deering, 1951) §17043. 
36 Found in seven states; California (see note 35 supra), Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Washington. 
37 Kansas, Oklahoma, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. Several explicitly use the 
term "loss leader" in reference to the prohibited practices. This shift of emphasis to 
injury to the purchaser seems characteristic of the later enactments, particularly those in 
1939 and 1941. 
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purchase of other merchandise, unfairly to divert trade from a 
competitor or otherwise to injure a competitor would be a fair 
summary of their content. 
The "intent or effect" type of statute had a parallel develop-
ment, beginning with Tennessee's 1937 enactment. Under it, 
below-cost sales are prohibited when rp.ade with the intent or effect 
of inducing purchase of other merchandise, unfairly diverting 
trade from or otherwise injuring a competitor, where the result is 
a tendency to deceive purchasers, to lessen competition, to restrain 
trade, or to tend to monoply. Variations of this statute were 
enacted in six other states.38 In addition, two states prohibit such 
sales when made with the intent or effect of injuring competitors 
or destroying competition,39 and one40 prohibits sales when made 
with the intent of unfairly diverting trade from or otherwise in-
juring a competitor, or which have the result of deceiving cus-
tomers, substantially lessening competition, unreasonably restrain-
ing trade, or tending to monopoly.41 
A. The Requirement of Intent 
One of the more perplexing problems under either type of 
statute is whether a general or a specific intent is required. It is 
axiomatic that a seller's efforts are normally directed toward in-
creasing his volume of business; if he is successful in doing so in a 
competitive market, his gain is almost invariably accompanied by 
a competitor's loss. Thus, it can be said that an intent to attract 
additional trade necessarily includes an intent to injure competi-
tors, and that thus the former intent meets the intent requirement 
of the statutes. This reasoning and conclusion is reinforced by 
the frequent statutory presumption of violation upon a showing 
of a below-cost sale and its injurious effect.42 
38 Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Utah. 
39 Minnesota, New Hampshire. The original Minnesota statute, derived in part from 
California's, read "injuring competitors and destroying competition." It was amended to 
its present form in 1957 after the decision of State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W. 
(2d) 401 (1957), which refused to find violation if only "injury" was proved. 
40 Pennsylvania. That state's original act, requiring neither intent nor effect for 
violation, was declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d) 
67 (1940). 
41 Oregon, requiring only that the effect of a sale below cost substantially lessen 
competition, injure competitors, destroy competition, unreasonably restrain trade, or 
tend to monopoly, fits neither of the categories discussed in the text. The New Jersey 
statute, requiring neither intent nor effect, was declared unconstitutional and has never 
been reenacted in different form. See Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 
8 A. (2d) 291 (1939). 
42 Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Utah and Wyoming are the states which do not have the presumption or its 
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On the other hand, the statutory requirement of intent could 
as well be construed as being limited to the case where the seller's 
motive is malicious.43 However, predatory price-cutting is recog-
nized as unlawful under the antitrust acts; 44 it could be argued, 
therefore, that sales-below-cost statutes would serve no purpose if 
they were designed merely to cumulate the illegality of that 
practice. 
Despite occasional vacillations, the courts have generally 
favored the requirement of a specific intent. In an early California 
case45 it was held that proof that the sole purpose of defendant's 
below-cost sales was to meet competition and to advertise and 
stimulate his own business constituted a full defense, and would 
be sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of violation. 
Similarly, where an alleged violator testified that he had no intent 
to injure his competitors but that he did intend his advertising to 
attract as many customers as possible, from any source whatsoever, 
it was held that the requisite intent was not present.46 Colorado 
courts, after first holding that the seller's intending the natural and 
equivalent. The presumption was declared unconstitutional in Minnesota, Great Atlantic 
&: Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, (D.C. Minn. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 70, and Maine, Wiley v. Samp-
son-Ripley Co., 151 Me. 400, 120 A. (2d) 289 (1956). The Minnesota statute was amended 
to cure the defect. 
The prohibition of a statute containing the presumption may be analogized to the 
prima facie tort theory of liability discussed in note 17 supra: a sale below cost is, prima 
facie, unlawful, and upon the seller falls the burden of justifying his act. 
43 It has been said that the effect of the sales-below-cost statute was to change the 
common law so that solely malicious motives are no longer necessary, that sales made with 
mixed motives of gain and maliciousness were thereby rendered unlawful. State v. Langley, 
53 Wyo. 332, 84 P. (2d) 767 (1938). Such an analysis seems correct and useful. 
44 E.g., under Federal Trade Commission Act §5, E. B. Muller 8e Co. v. FTC, (6th 
Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 511; under Sherman Act §I and Robinson-Patman Act §3, United 
States v. National Dairy Products Corp., (indictment returned Sept. 16, 1959, Dept. of 
Justice case 147B) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1f45,059. 
45 Balzer v. Caler, 11 Cal. (2d) 663, 82 P. (2d) 19 (1938). 
46 Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 254, 210 P. (2d) 314 (1949) (the issue was 
raised on defendant's cross-complaint). But plaintiff's testimony was such that it could 
have been held to evince a reckless disregard for the consequences of his acts. General tort 
principles would allow a court to infer a specific intent in that event. Cf. Mercer v. Cor-
bin, 117 Ind. 450, 20 N.E. (2d) 132 (1889). 
The Sandler case may be explained in part by its factual setting. Plaintiff was a 
newcomer in the area, and attempted to increase his relatively small patronage by under-
cutting his competitors' prices. Defendant, an established businessman, protested to no 
avail, and thereafter stole plaintiff's customer list. He then offered free service to those 
customers and was successful in capturing a majority of them. His defense to plaintiff's 
suit under the Unfair Practices Act was that of meeting plaintiff's competition. 
Contra, Los Angeles Laundry-Owners Assn. v. Cascade Laundry, (Cal. Super. 
1950) 1950-1951 CCH Trade Cas. 1f62,667 at p. 63,920. "The activity of the defendant 
in soliciting the customers of its competitors and in actually taking them away from its 
competitors, coupled with its admission of the knowledge that this would injure com-
petitors, constrains me to hold, in spite of evidence to the contrary, that the purpose of 
the defendant was actually to injure its competitors." 
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probable consequences of his act sufficed,47 later held that a specific 
intent was necessary and that evidence of intent other than to in-
jure competitors constituted a defense.48 
These decisions requiring a specific intent would seem justified 
by the history of the unfair practices acts. As is often true when 
pressure groups sponsor bills, 49 legislative history of sales-below-
cost statutes is sparse. However, two reasons can be suggested for 
the inclusion of an intent requirement. The first is the traditional 
reluctance of the courts to impose criminal penalties for acts done 
without criminal intent.50 The second can be deduced from the 
unequivocal language contained in the Fairmont Creamery 
opinion.51 While practically all of the present statutes were en-
acted after the decision of Nebbia v. New York,52 now generally 
regarded as giving the states extremely broad power to regulate 
prices, there was considerable doubt at the time of that decision 
whether it had completely overruled Fairmont Creamery.53 Of 
equal significance is the fact that the pioneer California statute, 
which furnished a pattern for other states, was enacted a year be-
fore the Nebbia decision.54 If it is accepted as a premise that the 
statutes were designed to meet the objections to unfair trade acts 
voiced in Fairmont Creamery, reference to that decision indicates 
clearly that the Court would not have been satisfied with an intent 
requirement that went merely to the merchant's normal desire to 
succeed in the marketplace.55 It follows, then, that a specific 
intent should be required under the statutes. 
47Dikeou v. Food Distributors Assn., 107 Colo. 38, 108 P. (2d) 529 (1940). 
48 Perkins v. King Soopers, 122 Colo. 263, 221 P. (2d) 343 (1950). See, generally, 
People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. (2d) 108, 153 P. (2d) 9 (1944); State v. Wolkoff, 
250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W. (2d) 401 (1957); Kansas v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 
432, 201 P. (2d) 1034 (1949); Henderson v. Hogue, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) 1956 CCH 
Trade Cas. n 68,462; Blum v. Engelman, 190 Md. 109, 57 A. (2d) 421 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d} 67 (1940). 
49 For an account of trade association activities in promoting the California legisla-
tion, see Grether, "Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting 
Price Cutting," 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640 (1936). See also comment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 816 at 
846 (1938). 
oO See State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, II3 P. (2d} 650 (1941). 
ol See note 23 supra. 
52 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
53 See, e.g., Lief v. Packard-Bamberger 8: Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A. (2d) 291 (1939); 
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d) 67 (1940); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Co. v. Ervin, (D.C. Minn. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 70. Cf. State v. Lanesboro Produce 8: Hatch-
ery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 21 N.W. (2d) 792 (1946) (dissenting opinion}; May's Drug Stores, 
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W. (2d} 245 (1951). See comments, 14 
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 286 (1939); 47 YALE L.J. 1201 (1938); 32 ILL. L. REv. 816 (1938}, 
Compare the quoted excerpts in notes 23 and 26 supra. 
54 Cal. Stat. (1933) 1280. 
55 See note 23 supra. 
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Assuming that specific intent is required, there remain for 
consideration those statutes which require merely an intent to (1) 
induce purchase of other merchandise or (2) unfairly divert trade 
from a competitor. It would seem that a merchant's general intent 
would be specific as to the former. 
The first provision is obviously directed toward the use of loss 
leaders.156 Of the nine statutes incorporating it, all but one have 
the additional requirement that the sale have certain results,157 of 
which a tendency to deceive purchasers is most clearly applicable 
here. Thus, there is no violation unless the purchaser is led to 
believe that other merchandise may be obtained at comparable 
savings.158 It could be argued that the modern housewife is no 
longer the gullible consumer whom the law was designed to pro-
tect; hence, a tendency toward deception should not necessarily be 
presumed. Nevertheless, this provision seems a clear legislative 
disapproval of tactics designed to lure the purchaser onto the pre-
mises so that he may be subjected to sales pressure on items other 
than those advertised.69 As such, it should be rigidly enforced. 
The policy against injury to the uninformed should be weighed 
against the real benefit afforded the ultimate consumer through 
lowered prices, particularly on staple items. The other "results"60 
which would fulfill the statutory requirements under this provision 
are phrased in terms which have come to include the application of 
a rule of reason. This would seem to indicate a legislative intent 
that a similar rule of reason be applied in deception cases. Proper 
balancing of interests can be achieved under such an interpreta-
tion, which would take into account the seller's purpose, market 
power, and the effects of his acts. 
As to provision (2), the meaning of "unfairly divert trade" in 
this context is debatable, since none of the statutes undertake to 
define it. If it is not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitu-
tional, 61 the phrase at least suggests that more is required than the 
intent merely to entice customers away from a competitor. A 
rule of reason approach is essential to its interpretation. 
IS6 Some of the acts, in a separate provision, prohibit the advertisement of goods which 
the merchant cannot supply. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (19511) §55-2-12. 
IS7 Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and 
Utah require, as a result, a tendency to deceive any purchaser, substantial lessening of 
competition, unreasonable restraint of trade, or a tendency to create a monopoly. Wis-
consin has no requirement that result be shown. 
ISS See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., 360 U.S. 334 (1959). 
59 Cf. F.T.C., "Guides Against Bait Advertising," 24 Fed. Reg. 9755 (Dec. 4, 1959). 
60 See note 57 supra. 
61 See Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy 8c Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 
12 A. (2d) 201 (1940), where the court invalidated a statute containing such a provision. 
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B. The Requirement of Effect 
The statutes which are satisfied by a showing of intent or effect 
in the alternative present many of the same considerations discussed 
above under the intent type. The normal consequences of a 
merchant's accomplishment of his general intent to bolster his 
trade are injury to competitors and diversion of their customers. 
Are all sales below cost therefore prohibited by "intent or effect" 
statutes? While there is little doubt that the statutes could be 
interpreted as a blanket legislative condemnation, 62 it is submitted 
that they should not be so construed. 
If a merchant is to avoid violating such a statute, he must first 
determine his cost of doing business to arrive at a lawful price. 
This would include that portion of salaries, heat, light, taxes, and 
rent which are attributable to each item in stock. Even if it were 
possible to apportion accurately these overhead costs, the account-
ing expenses involved in the determination would probably be 
prohibitive. The longer an item remained on the shelf, the higher 
would be its apportioned overhead and hence the higher its cost; 
therefore, a price which originally was greater than cost would 
become an unlawful price merely because of a slow turnover. 
Thus, a merchant would have to increase the price of an item when 
the logical and practical move would be to decrease its price in 
order to speed sales. To hold that the statute furnishes the mer-
chant with clear guides to lawful conduct under these circum-
stances is to disregard reality.63 
As an alternative, a court may require a merchant to add his 
average overhead expense, from a previous accounting period, to 
his other costs and thus arrive at a lawful price.64 Those items 
which have a rapid turnover and hence are in fact profitable at a 
low percentage markup would then be salable only at an artificially 
62 This discussion assumes the constitutionality of a sales-below-cost statute impos-
ing criminal sanctions but which requires no criminal intent. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 
580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940); Mcintire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A. (2d) 471 (1948). See 
May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W. (2d) 245 
(1951). Contra: Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A. (2d) 291 (1939); 
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d) 67 (1940). 
63 Cf. State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. (2d) 650 (1941). 
64 " ••• it cannot be that after the law has so carefully defined what enters into the 
cost of doing business ..• the party charged with violation thereof may, as a defense, 
allege and show that the particular item of merchandise upon which the accusation rests 
may be segregated from the entire business for the purpose of allocating as to it the 'cost 
of doing business.'" McFadden Lambert Co. v. Winston & Newell Co., 209 Minn. 242 
at 246, 296 N.W. 18 (1941). Contra, Standard Store v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. 1955) 1955 CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,153. 
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high price. Because such items are usually staple commodities, 
it is unwise from a policy standpoint to adopt this method. 
A third alternative would require the merchant to accept either 
the presumed markup or the cost of doing business determined 
by a survey, whichever method is allowed by the statute. This is 
equivalent to price-fixing. It deprives purchasers of the savings 
to be derived from efficient business conduct, and diverts them to 
the merchant whose costs are lowest. While the power of a state 
to fix prices is well established, 65 the advisability of employing 
this alternative is questionable in view of the avowed statutory 
purposes to promote competition and prevent monopoly.66 Fur-
thermore, when the state statute is utilized by private interests, such 
as trade associations, to enforce a uniform markup, there would 
appear to be irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act's pro-
hibition of private price-fixing as being unreasonable "per se."67 
The practical impossibility of computing costs under the first 
procedure, and the questionable desirability of requiring un-
restricted use of either of the two other procedures are cogent 
reasons for applying a rule of reason in determining whether viola-
tion exists when only adverse effect is alleged and required for a 
finding of violation.68 Admittedly, reading the requirement to 
be one of "unreasonable" injurious effect does little to clarify the 
elements of violation. However, it would allow the exercise of 
discretion. Competition is no longer limited to price alone, and 
frequently the merchant who is struggling to gain or maintain a 
foothold in a market area cannot compete with an established 
rival in service or facilities. In such a situation, it would seem 
65 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
66 E.g., Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code (Deering, 1951) §17000: "The legislature declares 
that the purpose of this chapter is to safeguard the public against the creation or per-
petuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, 
dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair 
and honest competition is destroyed and prevented." A more lengthy statement of policy 
and purpose, as in the Colorado statute, enjoys wider popularity. After reciting the 
calamitous effects (including economic depression) attributable to below-cost sales, it 
declares the state policy to be the protection of its citizens through the elimination of 
unfair methods of competition, to which class these sales belong. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
(1953) §44-1462. The terminology throughout might indicate a greater attention to 
emotional appeal than to dispassionate legislative findings. See Clark, "Statutory Re-
strictions on Selling Below Cost," 11 VAND. L. REv. 105 (1957). 
67 California Retail Grocers &: Merchants Assn. v. United States, (9th Cir. 1943) 139 
F. (2d) 978, cert. den. 322 U.S. 729 (1944). See comment, 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948). For 
an excellent illustration of trade association success in establishing uniform prices, see 
Los Angeles Laundry-Owners Assn. v. Cascade Laundry, (Cal. Super. 1950) 1950-51 CCH 
Trade Cas. ,r 62,667. 
68 See, generally, Clark, "Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below Cost," 11 VAND L. REv. 
105 (1957). 
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reasonable to allow his use of the only competitive weapon he may 
have, even when his sales below cost have the effect of diverting 
trade to him. To hold that his rival may enjoin his sales at lower 
prices would not promote competition, but instead would stifle it. 
And, even though the price-cutter's intent is clearly that of induc-
ing purchase of other goods, and customers are so induced, there 
would seem to be no purpose in condemning his acts unless an 
unreasonably high price were charged for the other merchandise. 
Again, the frequent use of words of art suggesting a rule-of-reason 
approach lends support to the conclusion. 69 
Ill. THE DEFENSE OF MEETING COMPETITION70 
All but three statutes71 provide, as a defense, that in a sale of 
merchandise below cost it may be shown that the price was set to 
meet that of a competitor. Whether the defense is another relic 
of the Fairmont Creamery case,72 was patterned after the Robinson-
Patman proviso, 73 or has been inserted for other reasons is not 
clear. However, both the wording of the statutes74 and the in-
terpreting cases75 support the proposition that the defense is sub-
stantive, and not merely' procedural.76 Thus the defendant can 
escape liability even when it is proved that the required intent 
or effect was present. 
A. Lawful Price 
A majority of the statutes condition the defense of meeting 
competition upon a requirement that the competitor's price that 
1s met be "legal," or "lawful." A minority contain no such 
69 See note 57 supra. 
70 See, generally, comment, 12 S.W. L. J. 482 (1958). 
71 Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina. 
72 Cf. dissent in State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246 at 263, 21 
N.W. (2d) 792 (1946). 
73 " ••• Provided, however, that nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-
27 of this title shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing 
that his lower price ... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor ..•. " 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (b). 
74 E.g., "The provisions of this act shall not apply to sales at retail or sales at whole-
sale . • . (7) where the price of merchandise is made in good faith to meet competi-
tion ... .'' Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; reissue of 1952) §59-1206. Compare with Robinson-Pat-
man proviso, note 73 supra. 
75 See People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. (2d) 108, 153 P. (2d) 9 (1944); Cohen 
v. Frey & Son, Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A. (2d) 267 (1951). It seems immaterial whether it 
is interpreted as a legislative declaration that sales to meet competition are not to be 
regarded as made with the required intent, or as an exclusion from the act as a whole. 
76 The Robinson-Patman proviso was given the same interpretation in Standard Oil 
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). See also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). 
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limitation,77 and at least one court has refused to imply such a 
requirement.78 It would seem that such a decision deprives the 
statute of any practical effect, since only the first price-cutter could 
be immediately restrained thereunder, with his imitators to be 
enjoined in the same sequence in which they initially cut their 
prices. The requirement of meeting a lawful price thus seems a 
practical essential. 
Is it necessary that defendant prove that the competitor's price 
was in fact legal? The difficulty of determining one's own cost of 
doing business, much less that of another, emphasizes the futility 
of the defense if such a burden were placed on defendant. A 
number of statutes requiring that the price be set "in good faith"79 
to meet a competitor's price have usually been construed to mean 
that if the merchant believes in good faith that the price he 
meets is lawful, there is no violation. 80 This would appear to be 
the proper interpretation for these statutes as well as for those 
statutes which do not incorporate the good faith phrase. Today's 
merchant is usually aware of the approximate invoice price which 
a competitor pays, and this figure establishes a floor for a reason-
able belief of legality. Above this floor, belief may or may not be 
reasonable in particular factual settings. 
77 Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Wis-
consin. 
78 Cohen v. Frey &: Son, Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A. (2d) 267 (1951). The court dis-
tinguished Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), which it read as indicating 
that only the meeting of lawful prices of a competitor would be a defense under the 
Robinson-Patman proviso. However, for federal court cases interpreting the Standard 
Oil decision as requiring only "good faith" in meeting competitor's prices, see Standard 
Oil Co. v. Brown, (5th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 54, and Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden 
Farms, Inc., (9th Cir. 1955) 231 F. (2d) 356, cert. den. 350 U.S. 991 (1956), reh. den. 351 
U.S. 928 (1956). 
79 E.g., Minn. Stat. (1957) §325.06 (4). 
so Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., (Okla. 1957) 322 P. (2d) 
179, affd. 360 U.S. 334 (1959); State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W. (2d) 401 
(1957); Kansas v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P. (2d) 1034 (1949); McIntire 
v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A. (2d) 471 (1948); State v. Sears, 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 103 P. 
(2d) 337 (1940). Requiring defendant to prove the absolute legality of the prices he meets 
may be unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d) 67 (1940); 
Lief v. Packard-Bamberger &: Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A. (2d) 291 (1939). Cf. the discussion 
of §2 {b) of the Robinson-Patman Act [15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (b)] in REPORT OF THE AT· 
TORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIITEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUsr LAws 179-186 (1955). 
Other matters can be relevant to the question of a defendant's good faith. People v. 
Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. (2d) 108, 153 P. (2d) 9 (1944) (below cost sales continued 
long after abandonment by competitors negatived any presumption of good faith); 
Northern California Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmer's Market of Northern California, Inc., 
(Cal. Super. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1f68,402 (below-cost sales, even though initiated 
six weeks after competitor's sales, were in good faith); Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 
254, 210 P. (2d) 314 (1949) (sales below cost, even though below the lowest competitive 
price, held not to be a violation). 
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B. 0 ther Limitations on the Defense 
In meeting a competitor's price, is the merchant restricted to 
sale of merchandise of the same brand and variety as that offered 
by his competitor? It is inadvisable to lay down a general rule in 
this area.81 Rather, the answer should depend upon the particular 
facts and upon the existence or non-existence of cross-elasticity of 
demand between the merchandise offered by defendant and that 
by his competitor. The small merchant, carrying only a few major 
brands whose cost is high, should not necessarily be put at a com-
petitive disadvantage when his competitor's stock includes more 
obscure brands whose cost is relatively low.82 
Is the distribution of trading stamps equivalent to a reduction 
in price on individual items sold? A recent Oklahoma decision 
held that it was not,83 and so the statute was not violated when 
deduction of the value of the stamps would have resulted in a net 
price of less than cost. In reaching this result, the court char-
acterized the giving of trading stamps as a discount for cash, rather 
than a reduction in price. The decision was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, despite arguments of denial of due process and 
equal protection of the laws.84 
Unfortunately, the frequent attempts to distinguish a reduc-
tion in price from a discount for cash85 have obscured the real 
issue. Whether trading stamps actually benefit the public or 
whether they merely increase the overall prices which the con-
sumer pays is a currently unsettled point.86 The Oklahoma court 
was of the opinion that trading stamps serve a useful purpose to 
the public, and hence their use should be excepted from the 
operation of a statute prohibiting sales below cost. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Statutes prohibiting sales below cost were conceived in an era 
of falling prices and consequent business failures. One of their 
81 See REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMrrrEE TO STUDY THE 
.ANTITRUST LAws 184 (1955). 
82 Northern California Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmer's Market of Northern California, 
Inc., 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r 68,402 (competition met by sales of merchandise of com-
parable cost and quality). 
83 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., (Okla. 1957) 322 P. (2d) 179. 
84 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., 360 U.S. 334 (1959). 
85 See, e.g., The Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A. (2d) 310 
(1954). 
86 See, generally, Charvat, "Economics of Trading Stamps," 7 J. PUB. L. 450 (1958); 
comments, 12 FLA. L. REv. 213 (1959), 105 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 242 (1956). 
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unrecited purposes undoubtedly was to inhibit this downward 
trend, and enforcement according to the literal wording of the 
statutes was probably appropriate to achieve this end. Today's 
markets and inflationary prices create a quite dissimliar econ-
omic atmosphere, and a disregard for the avowed statutory pur-
poses is no longer justified. 
Where unprofitable sales are utilized for predatory purposes 
the statutes afford a quick and efficient means of protection to the 
parties whose competitive existence is jeopardized. A predatory 
purpose may validly be inferred when below-cost sales are carried 
out with such frequency and scope as to indicate a reckless dis-
regard for the consequences of such sales.87 And, when below-cost 
merchandise is advertised to lure customers onto the premises 
where they are discouraged from purchasing the advertised goods 
and urged to purchase "superior" products at advanced prices, 
violation of the acts' purposes should be clear. 
Outside this area, which might be regarded as the area of "per 
se" illegality, the statutory purposes should be kept in view to 
insure that the statute is not used to suppress competition.88 The 
interest of the consuming public in having goods available at low 
prices and the practical difficulty of strict conformance with the 
statutory mandate, should be factors dictating the employment of 
a rule of reason in enforcing these statutes. 
Robert B. Jones, S. Ed. 
87 See note 46 supra. 
88 " ••• thus, an act which can be sustained only on the basis that it prevents mo-
nopoly and fosters competition is twisted to accomplish the direct opposite, namely, the 
sale of cigarettes at wholesale in Ohio at a uniform price." Serrer v. Cigarette Service 
Co., (Ohio App. 1947) 1946-47 CCH Trade Cas. 1f57,563 at p. 58,522, affd. 148 Ohio St. 
519, 76 N.E. (2d) 91 (1947). 
